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RESUMEN
Los aspectos éticos del mejoramiento humano han sido objeto de un intenso debate. Numerosos autores bien conocidos se han
involucrado en él o se han mostrado críticos con el uso de tecnologías capaces de modificar o mejorar a los seres humanos.
Quiero argumentar que tenemos una obligación moral o una razón moral para mejorarnos a nosotros mismos y a nuestros hijos,
no solo que se trata de algo meramente permisible. En realidad, tenemos el mismo tipo de obligación que tenemos de tratar y
prevenir enfermedades. No solo podemos mejorar: deberíamos mejorar.
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There has been considerable recent debate on the ethics of human enhancement. A number of prominent authors have been
concerned about or critical of the use of technology to alter or enhance human beings. I want to argue that far from being merely
permissible, we have a moral obligation or moral reason to enhance ourselves and our children. Indeed, we have the same kind of
obligation as we have to treat and prevent disease. Not only can we enhance, we should enhance.
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Genetic interventions and the ethics of enhancement of human beings *
Should we use science and medical technology not just to prevent or treat disease, but to intervene at the
most basic biological levels to improve biology and enhance people’s lives? By enhance, I mean help
them to live a longer and/or better life than normal. There are various ways in which we can enhance
people but I want to focus on biological enhancement, especially genetic enhancement.
There has been considerable recent debate on the ethics of human enhancement. A number of prominent
authors have been concerned about or critical of the use of technology to alter or enhance human beings
(Annas 2000: 753-782, Elliott 2003) citing threats to human nature and dignity as one basis for these
concerns (Fukuyama 2003, Kass 2002, Habermas 2003). The President’s Council Report entitled Beyond
Therapy was strongly critical of human enhancement. (President’s Council on Bioethics 2003) Michael
Sandel, in a widely discussed article, has suggested that the problem with genetic enhancement ‘is in the
hubris of the designing parents, in their drive to master the mystery of birth (…) it would disfigure the
relation between parent and child, and deprive the parent of the humility and enlarged human sympathies
that an openness to the unbidden can cultivate (…). [T]he promise of mastery is flawed. It threatens to
banish our appreciation of life as a gift, and to leave us with nothing to affirm or behold outside our own
will” (Sandel 2004).
Frances  Kamm  (2005)  has  given  a  detailed  rebuttal  of  Sandel’s  arguments,  arguing  that  human
enhancement is  permissible.  Nicholas Agar,  in  his book, Liberal  Eugenics,  argues  that  enhancement
should be permissible but not obligatory. He argues that what distinguishes liberal eugenics from the
objectionable eugenic practices of the Nazis is that it is not based on a single conception of a desirable
genome and that it is voluntary and not obligatory.
In  this  chapter,  I  will  take  a  more  provocative  position.  I  want  to  argue  that  far  from being  merely
permissible, we have a moral obligation or moral reason to enhance ourselves and our children. Indeed,
we have the same kind of obligation as we have to treat and prevent disease. Not only can we enhance,
we should enhance.
I will begin by considering the current interests in and possibilities of enhancement. I will then offer 3
arguments that we have very strong reasons to seek to enhance.
Tom Murray concludes his  thoughtful  and wide ranging treatment  of  enhancement in  this  volume by
arguing that ‘the ethics of enhancement must take into account the meaning and purpose of the activities
being enhanced,  their  social  context,  and the other persons and institutions affected by them’.  Such
caution is no doubt well  grounded. But it  should not blind us to the very large array of cases where
biological modification will improve the opportunities of an individual to lead a better life. In such cases,
we have strong reasons to modify ourselves and our children. Indeed, to fail to do so would be wrong.
Discussion of enhancement can be muddied by groundless fears and excessive caution and qualification.
I will outline some ethical constraints on the pursuit of enhancement.
 
Current Interest in Enhancement
There is great public interest in enhancement of people. Women employ cosmetic surgery to make their
nose smaller, their breasts larger, their teeth straighter and whiter, to make their cheekbones higher, their
lips  bigger  and to  remove wrinkles  and fat.  Men,  too,  employ  many of  these measures,  as well  as
pumping their  bodies with  steroids to  increase muscle bulk.  The beauty industry  is  testimony to  the
attraction of  enhancement.  Body art,  such as painting and tattooing,  and body modification,  such as
piercing, have, since time began, represented ways in which humans have attempted to express their
creativity, values and symbolic attachments through changing their bodies.
Modern professional sport is often said to be corrupted by widespread use of performance enhancing
drugs, such as human erythropoietin, anabolic steroids, and growth hormone. However, some effective
performance enhancements are permitted in sport, such as the use of caffeine, glutamine and creatine in
diets, salbutamol, hypoxic air tents, and altitude training.
Many people attempt to improve their cognitive powers through the use of nicotine, caffeine, and drugs
like Ritalin and Modavigil.
Mood enhancement typifies modern society. People use psychological “self-help”, prozac, recreational
drugs, and alcohol to feel more relaxed, socialize better, and feel happier.
Even in the most private area of sexual relations, many want to be better. Around 34% of all men aged
40-70 -around 20 million in the US- have some erectile dysfunction which is a part of normal aging. There
is a 12% decline in erectile function every decade normally. As a result, 20 million men world wide use
Viagra (Cheitlin 1999).
More radical forms of biological enhancement appear possible. Even if all disease (heart disease, cancer,
etc.)  were cured,  the average human life  span would only be extended by 12 years (Sarah Harper,
personal communication). However, stem cell science has the potential to extend human lifespan radically
further than this, by replacing aging tissue with healthy tissue (Harris 2000, 2004, 2002). We could live
longer than the current maximum of 120 years.
But instead of the radical prolongation of length of life, I want to focus on the radical improvement in
quality of life through biological manipulation. Some sceptics believe this is not possible. The skeptic
claims that it is our environment, or culture, that defines us, not genetics. But a quiet walk in the park
demonstrates the power of a great genetic experiment: dog breeding. It is obvious that different breeds of
dog differ  in  temperament,  intelligence,  physical  ability,  and  appearance.  No matter  what  the  turf,  a
Doberman will tear a Corgi to pieces. You can debilitate a Doberman through neglect and abuse. And you
can  make  him  prettier  with  a  bow.  But  you  will  never  turn  a  Chihuahua  into  a  Doberman  through
grooming, training, and affection. Dog breeds are all genetic -for over ten thousand years we have bred
some 300-400 breeds of dog from early canids and wolves. The St. Bernard is known for its size, the
Greyhound for its speed, the Bloodhound for its sense of smell. There are freaks, hard workers, vicious
aggressors, docile pets, and ornamental varieties. These characteristics have been developed by a crude
form of genetic selection -selective mating or breeding.
Today we have powerful scientific tools in animal husbandry –genetic testing, artificial reproduction and
cloning are all routinely used in the farming industry to create the best stock. Scientists are now starting to
look at a wider range of complex behaviours. Changing the brain’s reward centre genetically may be the
key to changing behaviour.
Gene therapy has been used to turn lazy monkeys into workaholics by altering the reward centre in the
brain (Liu 2004). In another experiment, researchers used gene therapy to introduce a gene from the
monogamous male prairie vole, a rodent which forms life-long bonds with one mate, into the brain of the
closely related but polygamous meadow vole (Lim 2004). Genetically modified meadow voles became
monogamous, behaving like prairie voles. This gene, which controls a part of the brain’s reward centre
different  to that  altered in the monkeys,  is  known as the vasopressin receptor  gene.  It  may also be
involved in human drug addiction.
Radical enhancements may come on the back of very respected research to prevent and treat disease.
Scientists have created a rat model of the genetic disease, Huntington Disease. This disease results in
progressive rapid dementia at  about  40.  Scientists  found that  rats engineered to develop Huntington
disease who were placed in a highly stimulating environment (of mazes and coloured rings and balls) did
not go on to develop this disease -their neurons remained intact (van Dellen 2000, Spires 2004).
Remotivation  therapy  improves  functioning  in  humans,  suggesting  environmental  stimulation  in  this
genetic disease may affect brain biology at the molecular level (by altering neurotrophins) (Sullivan 2001).
Prozac has also been shown to produce a beneficial effect in humans suffering from Huntington Disease
(De Marchi 2001).  Neural  stem cells have also been identified which could potentially  be induced to
proliferate and differentiated (Rietze 2001),  mediated through nerve growth factors and other  factors
(Palma 2005). We now know that a stimulating environment, drugs like Prozac, and nerve growth factors
can affect  nerve proliferation  and connections  -that  is  our  brain’s  biology.  These same interventions
-stimulating environment, Prozac, nerve growth factors- could, at least in theory, be used to increase the
neuronal complement of normal brains and increase cognitive performance in normal individuals.
IQ has been steadily increasing since first measured, about 20 points per decade. This has been called
the Flynn effect (Holloway 1999). Large environmental effects have been postulated to account for this
effect (Dickens 2001). The capacity to increase IQ is significant. Direct biological enhancement could
have an equally if not greater effect on increase in IQ.
But  could  biological  enhancement  of  human  beings  really  be  possible?  Selective  mating  has  been
occurring in humans ever since time began. Facial asymmetry can reflect genetic disorder. Smell can tell
us whether our mate will produce the child with the best resistance to disease. We compete for partners in
elaborate mating games and rituals of display which sort the best matches from the worst. As products of
evolution, we select our mates, both rationally and instinctively, on the basis of their genetic fitness –their
ability to survive and reproduce. Our (subconscious) goal is the success of our offspring.
With the tools of  genetics,  we can select  offspring in a more reliable way. The power of  genetics is
growing. Embryos can now be tested not only for the presence of genetic disorder (including some forms
of bowel and breast cancer), but also for less serious genetic abnormalities, such as dental abnormalities.
Sex can be tested for too. Adult athletes have been genetically tested for the presence of the ACTN3
gene to  identify  potential  for  either  sprint  or  endurance events.  Research is  going on in  the field  of
behavioural genetics to understand the genetic basis of aggression and criminal behaviour, alcoholism,
anxiety, antisocial personality disorder, maternal behaviour, homosexuality, and neuroticism.
While at present there are no genetic tests for these complex behaviours, if the results of recent animal
studies into hard work and monogamy apply to humans, it may be possible in the future to genetically
change how we are predisposed to behave. This raises a new question: should we try to engineer better,
happier  people?  While  at  present  genetic  technology  is  most  efficient  at  selecting  among  different
embryos, in the future it will be possible to genetically alter existing embryos, with considerable progress
already being made to the use of this technology for permanent gene therapy of disease (Urnov 2005).
There is no reason that such technology could not be used to alter non-disease genes in the future.
 
The Ethics of Enhancement
“We want to be happy people, not just healthy people”
I will now give 3 arguments in favour of enhancement and then consider several objections.
1. First Argument for Enhancement: Choosing Not to Enhance Is Wrong.
Consider the case of the Neglectful Parents. The Neglectful parents give birth to a child with a special
condition.  The  child  has  a  stunning  intellect  but  requires  a  simple,  readily  available,  cheap  dietary
supplement to sustain his intellect. But they neglect the diet of this child and this results in a child with a
stunning intellect becoming normal. This is clearly wrong.
But now consider the case of the Lazy Parents. They have a child who has a normal intellect but if they
introduced the same dietary supplement, the child’s intellect would rise to the same level as the child of
the Neglectful Parent. They can’t be bothered with improving the child’s diet so the child remains with a
normal  intellect.  Failure  to  institute  dietary  supplementation  means a  normal  child  fails  to  achieve a
stunning intellect. The inaction of the Lazy Parents is as wrong as the inaction of the Neglectful parents. It
has exactly the same consequence: a child exists who could have had a stunning intellect but is instead
normal.
Some argue that it is not wrong to fail to bring about the best state of affairs. This may or may not be the
case. But in these kinds of case, when there are no other relevant moral considerations, the failure to
introduce a diet which sustains a more desirable state is as wrong as the failure to introduce a diet which
brings about a more desirable state. The costs of inaction are the same, as are the parental obligations.
If  we substitute “biological intervention” for “diet”,  we see that in order not to wrong our children, we
should  enhance them.  Unless  there  is  something  special  and  optimal  about  our  children’s  physical,
psychological, or cognitive abilities, or something different about other biological interventions, it would be
wrong not to enhance them.
2. Second Argument: Consistency.
Some will object that, while we do have an obligation to institute better diets, biological interventions like
genetic  interventions are  different  to  dietary  supplementation.  I  will  argue that  there  is  no difference
between these interventions.
In general, we accept environmental interventions to improve our children. Education, diet, and training
are all used to make our children better people and increase their opportunities in life. We train children to
be well  behaved,  co-operative,  and intelligent.  Indeed,  researchers are looking at  ways to  make the
environment more stimulating for young children to maximize their intellectual development. But in the
study of the rat model of Huntington’s Disease, the stimulating environment acted to change the brain
structure of the rats. The drug Prozac acted in just the same way. These environmental manipulations do
not act mysteriously. They alter our biology.
The most striking example of this is a study of rats which were extensively mothered and rats who were
not mothered. The mothered rats showed genetic changes (changes in the methylation of the DNA) which
were passed on to the next generation. As Michael Meaney has observed, “Early experience can actually
modify protein-DNA interactions that regulate gene expression” (Society for Neuroscience 2004). More
generally, environmental manipulations can profoundly affect biology. Maternal care and stress have been
associated with abnormal brain (hippocampal) development, involving altered nerve growth factors and
cognitive, psychological, and immune deficits later in life.
Some argue that genetic manipulations are different because they are irreversible. But environmental
interventions can equally be irreversible. Child neglect or abuse can scar a person for life. It may be
impossible to unlearn the skill of playing the piano or riding a bike, once learnt. One may be wobbly, but
one  is  a  novice  only  once.  Just  as  the  example  of  mothering  of  rats  shows  that  environmental
interventions  can  cause  biological  changes  which  are  passed  onto  the  next  generation,  so  too  can
environmental interventions be irreversible, or very difficult to reverse, within one generation.
Why  should  we  allow  environmental  manipulations  which  alter  our  biology  but  not  direct  biological
manipulations? What is the moral difference between producing a smarter child by immersing that child in
a stimulating environment, giving the child a drug, or directly altering the child’s brain or genes?
One example of a drug which alters brain chemistry is Prozac. It is a serotonin reuptake inhibitor. Early in
life it acts as a nerve growth factor. But it may alter the brain early in life to make it more prone to stress
and anxiety later in life, by altering receptor development (Holden 2004). People with a polymorphism that
reduced their serotonin activity were more likely than others to become depressed in response to stressful
experiences  (Holden  2003).  Both  drugs  like  Prozac  and  maternal  deprivation  may  have  the  same
biological effects.
If the outcome is the same, why treat biological manipulation differently to environmental manipulation?
Not only may a favourable environment improve a child’s biology and increase a child’s opportunities, so
too may direct biological interventions. Couples should maximize the genetic opportunity of their children
to lead a good life and a productive, cooperative social existence.
There is no relevant moral difference between environmental and genetic intervention.
3. Third Argument: No Difference to Treating Disease.
If we accept the treatment and prevention of disease, we should accept enhancement. The goodness of
health is what drives a moral obligation to treat or prevent disease. But health is not what ultimately
matters -health enables us to live well; disease prevents us from doing what we want and what is good.
Health is instrumentally valuable- valuable as a resource that allows us to do what really matters, that is,
lead a good life.
What constitutes a good life is a deep philosophical question. According to hedonistic theories, what is
good  is  having  pleasant  experiences  and  being  happy.  According  to  desire  fulfillment  theories,  and
economics,  what  matters is  having our  preferences satisfied.  According to objective theories,  certain
activities are good for people -developing deep personal relationships, developing talents, understanding
oneself and the world, gaining knowledge, being a part of a family, and so on. We need not decide on
which of these theories is correct to understand what is bad about ill health. Disease is important because
it causes pain, is not what we want, and stops us engaging in those activities that giving meaning to life.
Sometimes  people  trade  health  for  well-being  -mountain  climbers  take  on  risk  to  achieve,  smokers
sometimes believe that the pleasures outweigh the risks of smoking, and so on. Life is about managing
risk to health and life to promote well-being.
Beneficence -the moral obligation to benefit people- provides a strong reason to enhance people in so far
as the biological enhancement increases their chance of having a better life.
But can biological enhancements increase people’s opportunities for well-being? There are reasons to
believe they might.
Many of our biological and psychological characteristics profoundly affect how well our lives go. In the
1960s Walter Mischel conducted impulse control experiments where 4-year-old children were left in a
room with one marshmallow, after being told that if they did not eat the marshmallow, they could later
have two.  Some children would eat  it  as soon as the researcher  left,  others would use a variety  of
strategies to help control their behaviour and ignore the temptation of the single marshmallow.
A  decade  later,  they  reinterviewed  the  children  and  found  that  those  who  were  better  at  delaying
gratification had more friends, better academic performance, and more motivation to succeed. Whether
the child had grabbed for the marshmallow had a much stronger bearing on their SAT scores than did
their IQ (Mischel 1988).
Impulse control has also been linked to socioeconomic control and avoiding conflict with the law. The
problems of a hot and uncontrollable temper can be profound.
Shyness too can greatly restrict a life. I remember one newspaper story about a woman who blushed
violet every time she went into a social situation. This led her to a hermitic, miserable existence. She
eventually had the autonomic nerves to her face surgically cut. This revolutionized her life and had a
greater effect on her well-being than the treatment of many diseases.
Buchanan and colleagues have discussed the value of ‘all purpose goods’ (Buchanan 2000). These are
traits which are valuable regardless of which kind of life a person chooses to live. They give us greater all
around capacities to live a vast array of  lives.  Examples include intelligence, memory, self-discipline,
patience, empathy, a sense of humour, optimism, and just having a sunny temperament. All  of these
characteristics   -sometimes  may  include  virtues-  may  have  some biological  and  psychological  basis
capable of manipulation with technology.
Technology  might  even  be  used  to  improve  our  moral  character.  We  certainly  seek  through  good
instruction and example, discipline, and other methods to make better children. It may be possible to alter
biology to make people predisposed to be more moral by promoting empathy, imagination, sympathy,
fairness, honesty, etc.
In so far as these characteristics have some genetic basis, genetic manipulation could benefit us. There is
reason to believe that complex virtues like fairmindedness may have a biological basis. In one famous
experiment, a monkey was trained to perform a task and rewarded either a grape or piece of cucumber.
He preferred the grape. On one occasion, he performed the task successfully and was given a piece of
cucumber.  He watched as another monkey who had not  performed the task was given a grape. He
became very angry. This shows that even monkeys have a sense of fairness and desert -or at least
self-interest!
At the other end, there are characteristics which we believe do not make for a good and happy life. One
Dutch family illustrates the extreme end of the spectrum (Brunner 1993a, Savulescu forthcoming).
For  over  30  years  this  family  recognized  that  there  were  a  disproportionate  number  of  male  family
members who exhibited aggressive and criminal  behaviour (Morell  1993).  This  was characterized by
aggressive  outbursts  resulting  in  arson,  attempted  rape,  and  exhibitionism  (Brunner  1993b).  The
behaviour has been documented for almost forty years by an unaffected maternal grandfather who could
not understand why some of the men in his family appeared to be prone to this type of behaviour.
Male  relatives  who did  not  display  this  aggressive  behaviour  did  not  express  any  type  of  abnormal
behaviour.  Unaffected  males  reported  difficulty  in  understanding  the  behaviour  of  their  brothers  and
cousins. Sisters of the males who demonstrated these extremely aggressive outbursts reported intense
fear  of  their  brothers.  The  behaviour  did  not  appear  to  be  related  to  environment  and  appeared
consistently in different parts of the family, regardless of social context and degree of social contact.
All affected males were also found to be mildly mentally retarded with a typical IQ of about 85 (females
had normal intelligence) (Brunner 1993b). When a family tree was constructed, the pattern of inheritance
was  clearly  X-linked  recessive.  This  means,  roughly,  that  women can  carry  the  gene  without  being
affected; 50% of men at risk of inheriting the gene get the gene and are affected by the disease.
Genetic analysis suggested that the likely defective gene was a part of the X chromosome known as the
Monoamine  Oxidase  (MAO)  region.  The  MAO  region  codes  for  two  enzymes  which  assist  in  the
breakdown of neurotransmitters. Neurotransmitters are substances that play a key role in the conduction
of  nerve impulses in  our  brain.  Enzymes like the monoamine oxidases are  required to  degrade the
neurotransmitters after they have performed their desired task. It was suggested that the monoamine
oxidase activity might be disturbed in the affected individuals. Urine analysis showed a higher than normal
amount of neurotransmitters being excreted in the urine of affected males (Morrell 1993). These results
found were consistent with a reduction in the functioning of one of the enzymes (monoamine oxidase A).
How could such a mutation result in violent and antisocial behaviour?
A  deficiency  of  the  enzyme  results  in  a  build  up  of  neurotransmitters.  These  abnormal  levels  of
neurotransmitters result in excessive, and even violent, reactions to stress. This hypothesis was further
supported by the finding that genetically modified mice which lack this enzyme are more aggressive.
This family is an extreme example of how genes can influence behaviour. This mutation has only been
isolated in this family. Most genetic contributions to behaviour will be weaker predispositions. Yet there
may be some association between genes and behaviour which results in criminal prosecution and other
antisocial behaviour. In one family, a mutation in monamine oxidase A, an enzyme in the brain, has been
associated with mild intellectual disability and violent behaviour.
How could such information be used? Some criminals have attempted a “genetic defense” in the US
which stated that their genes caused them to commit the crime. This has never succeeded. However, it is
clear that couples should be allowed to use this test to select offspring who do not have the mutation
which predisposes them to act in this way. And if interventions were available, it might be rational to
correct it. Children without this mutation have a better chance of a better life.
“Genes, not men, may hold the key to female pleasure” ran the title of one recent newspaper article. It
reported the results of a large study of female identical twins in Britain and Australia. It found that
“genes accounted for 31 per cent of the chance of having an orgasm during intercourse and 51 per
cent during masturbation”. It concluded that the ‘ability to gain sexual satisfaction is largely inherited’
and went on to speculate that “[t]he genes involved could be linked to physical differences in sex
organs and hormone levels or factors such as mood and anxiety” (The Age 2005).
Our biology profoundly affects how our lives go.  If  we can increase sexual  satisfaction by modifying
biology, we should. Indeed, vast numbers of men attempt to do this already through the use of Viagra.
Summary: The Case in Favour of Enhancement.
What matters is human well-being, not only treatment and prevention of disease. Our biology affects our
opportunities  to  live  well.  The  biological  route  to  improvement  is  no  different  to  the  environmental.
Biological manipulation to increase opportunity is ethical. If we have an obligation to treat and prevent
disease, we have an obligation to try to manipulate these characteristics to give an individual the best
opportunity of the best life.
 
How do we decide?
If  we  are  to  enhance  certain  qualities,  how should  we  decide  which  to  choose?  Eugenics  was  the
movement early last century which aimed to use selective breeding to prevent degeneration of the gene
pool by weeding out criminals, those with mental illness, and the poor, on the false belief that these
conditions were simple genetic disorders. The eugenics movement had its inglorious peak when the Nazis
moved beyond sterilization to extermination of the genetically unfit.
What was objectionable about the eugenics movement, besides its shoddy scientific basis, was that it
involved the imposition of  a State vision for  a healthy population and aimed to achieve this through
coercion.  The eugenics movement was not  aimed at  what  was good for  individuals,  but  rather what
benefited society. Modern eugenics in the form of testing for disorders, such as Down syndrome, occurs
very commonly but is acceptable because it is voluntary, gives couples a choice over what kind of child to
have, and enables them to have a child with the greatest opportunity for a good life.
There are four possible ways in which our genes and biology will  be decided: 1) Nature or  God;  2)
“Experts” -philosophers, bioethicists, psychologists, scientists; 3) “Authorities” –government, doctors; 4)
By people themselves -liberty and autonomy.
It is a basic principle of liberal states like the UK that the State be ‘neutral’ to different conceptions of the
good life. This means that we allow individuals to lead the life that they believe is best for themselves
-respect for their personal autonomy or capacity for self-rule. The sole ground for interference is when that
individual  choice  may  harm  others.  Advice,  persuasion,  information,  dialogue  are  permissible.  But
coercion and infringement of liberty are impermissible.
There are limits to what a liberal state should provide:
1. Safety -the intervention should be reasonably safe.
2. Harm to others -the intervention (like some manipulation that increases uncontrollable aggressiveness)
should not result in harm. Such harm should not be direct or indirect, for example, by causing some unfair
competitive advantage.
3. Distributive justice -the interventions should be distributed according to principles of justice
The situation is more complex with young children, embryos, and fetuses who are incompetent. These
human beings  are  not  autonomous and cannot  make  choices  themselves  about  whether  a  putative
enhancement is a benefit or harm. If a proposed intervention can be delayed until that human can reach
maturity  and decide for  himself  or  herself,  then the intervention  should  be delayed.  However,  many
genetic interventions will have to be performed very early in life if they are to have an effect. Decisions
about such interventions should be left  to parents,  according to a principle of  procreative liberty and
autonomy. This states that parents have the freedom to choose when to have children, how many children
to have, and arguably what kind of children to have.
Just as parents have wide scope to decide on the conditions of the upbringing of their child, including
schooling  and  religious  education,  they  should  have  similar  freedom  over  their  children’s  genes.
Procreative  autonomy  or  liberty  should  be  extended  to  enhancement  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,
reproduction, bearing and raising children is a very private matter. Parents must bear much of the burden
of having children and they have a legitimate stake in the nature of the child they must invest so much of
their lives raising (Savulescu 2002).
But there is a second reason. John Stuart Mill argued that when our actions only affect ourselves, we
should be free to construct and act on our own conception of what is the best life for us. Mill was not a
libertarian.  He did  not  believe that  such freedom was solely  valuable for  its  own sake.  He believed
freedom was important for people to discover for themselves what kind of life is best for themselves. It is
only through “experiments in living” that people discover what works for them. And do others see the
richness and variety of lives that can be good. Mill strongly praised “originality” and variety in choice as
being essential to discovering which lives are best for human beings.
Importantly,  Mill  believed that some lives are worse than others.  Famously,  he said it  is better to be
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. He distinguished between “higher pleasures” of “feelings and
imagination” and “lower pleasures” of “mere sensation” (Mill 1910: 7). Mill criticized “ape-like imitation”,
subjugation of oneself to custom and fashion, indifference to individuality, and lack of originality (Mill 1910:
119-120, 123).
Nonetheless, he was the champion of people’s right to live their lives as they choose.
“I have said that it is important to give the freest scope possible to uncustomary things, in order that it
may appear in time which of these are fit to be converted into customs. But independence of action,
and disregard of custom, are not solely deserving of encouragement for the chance they afford that
better modes of action, and customs more worthy of general adoption, may be struck out; nor is it
only persons of decided mental superiority who have a just claim to carry on their lives in their own
way.  There is  no reason that  all  human existence should be constructed on some one or  small
number of patterns. If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience,
his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it
is his own mode” (Mill 1910: 125).
I believe that reproduction should be about having children with the best prospects. But to discover what
are the best prospects, we must give individual couples the freedom to act on their own value judgment of
what constitutes a life of good prospect. “Experiments in reproduction” are as important as “experiments
in living” (as long as they don’t harm the children who are produced.) For this reason, procreative freedom
is important.
There is one important limit to procreative autonomy that is different to the limits to personal autonomy.
The limits to procreative autonomy should be:
1. Safety.
2. Harm to others.
3. Distributive justice.
4. The parent’s choices are based on a plausible conception of well-being and a better life for the child.
5. Consistent with development of autonomy in child and a reasonable range of future life plans.
These last two limits are important. It makes for a higher standard of ‘proof’ that an intervention will be an
enhancement  because  the  parents  are  making  choices  for  their  child,  not  themselves.  The  critical
question to ask in considering whether to alter some gene related to complex behaviour is: would the
change be better  for  the  individual?  Is  it  better  for  the  individual  to  have a  tendency to  be lazy  or
hardworking; monogamous or polygamous? These questions are difficult to answer. While we might let
adults  choose  to  be  monogamous or  polygamous,  we would  not  let  parents  decide  on  their  child’s
predispositions unless we were reasonably clear that some trait was better for the child. There will be
cases where some intervention is plausibly in a child’s interests: increased empathy with other people,
better  capacity  to  understand  oneself  and  the  world  around,  or  improved  memory.  One  quality  is
especially associated with socioeconomic success and staying out of prison: impulse control. If it were
possible to correct poor impulse control, we should correct it. Whether we should remove impulsiveness
altogether is another question.
Joel Feinberg has described a child’s right to an open future (Feinberg 1980). An open future is one in
which a child a reasonable range of possible lives to choose from and an opportunity to choose what kind
of person to be. That is, to develop autonomy. Some critics of enhancement have argued that genetic
interventions are inconsistent with a child’s right to an open future (Davis 1997). Far from restricting a
child’s future, however, some biological interventions may increase the possible futures or at least their
quality. It is hard to see how improved memory or empathy would restrict a child’s future. Many worthwhile
possibilities  would  be open.  But  is  true that  parental  choices should  not  restrict  the development  of
autonomy or reasonable range of possible futures open to a child. In general, fewer enhancements will be
permitted in children than in adult. Some interventions, however, may still be clearly enhancements for our
children and so just like vaccinations or other preventative health care.
 
Objections
1. Playing God or Against Nature.
This objection has various forms. Some people in society believe that children are a gift, of God or of
Nature, and that we should not interfere in human nature. Most people implicitly reject this view -we
screen embryos and fetuses for diseases, even mild correctible diseases. We interfere in Nature or God’s
will  when  we  vaccinate,  provide  pain  relief  to  women  in  labour  (despite  objections  of  some  earlier
Christians that these practices thwarted God’s will) and treat cancer. No one would object to the treatment
of disability in a child, if  it  were possible. Why then, not treat the embryo with genetic therapy if that
intervention is safe? This is no more thwarting God’s will than giving antibiotics.
Another variant of this objection is that we are arrogant to assume we can have sufficient knowledge to
meddle  with  human nature.  Some people  object  that  we cannot  know the complexity  of  the  human
system, which is like an unknowable magnificent symphony. To attempt to enhance one characteristic
may have other unknown, unforeseen effects elsewhere in the system. We should not play God -we
should be humble and recognise the limitations of our knowledge. Unlike God, we are not omnipotent or
omniscient.
A related objection is that genes are pleiotropic -which means they have different effects in different
environments. The gene or genes which predispose to manic depression may also be responsible for
heightened creativity and productivity.
One  response  to  both  these  objections  is  to  limit  our  interventions,  until  our  knowledge  grows,  to
selections between different embryos and not intervene to enhance particular embryos or people. Since
we would be choosing between complete systems on the basis of their type, we would not be interfering
with  the  internal  machinery.  In  this  way,  selection  is  less  risky  than  enhancement  (Savulescu,
forthcoming).
But such precaution can be also misplaced when considering biological interventions. When benefits are
on offer, such objections remind us to refrain from hubris and overconfidence. We must do adequate
research  before  intervening.  And because  the  benefits  may  be  less  than  when we treat  or  prevent
disease, we may require the standards of safety to be higher than for medical interventions. But we must
weigh the risks against the benefit.  If  confidence is justifiably high, and benefits outweigh harms, we
should enhance.
Once technology affords us with the power to enhance our and our children’s lives, to fail to do so will be
to be responsible for the consequences. To fail to treat our children’s disease, is to wrong them. To fail to
prevent  them  getting  depression,  is  to  wrong  them.  To  fail  to  improve  their  physical,  musical,
psychological, and other capacities is to wrong them, just as it would be to harm them if we gave them a
toxic substance that stunted or reduced these capacities.
Another variant of the “Playing God” objection is that there is a special value in the balance and diversity
that natural variation affords, and enhancement will reduce this. But in so far as we products of evolution,
we are merely random chance variations of genetic traits selected for our capacity to survive long enough
to reproduce. There is no design to evolution. Evolution selects genes according to environment which
confer the greatest chance of survival and reproduction. Evolution would select a tribe which was highly
fertile but suffered great pain the whole of their lives over another tribe which was less fertile but suffered
less pain. Medicine has changed evolution -we can now select individuals who experience less pain and
disease. The next stage of human evolution will be rational evolution, where we select children who not
only have the greatest chance of surviving, reproducing, and being free of disease, but who have the
greatest opportunities to have the best lives in their likely environment. Evolution was indifferent to how
well our lives went. We are not. We want to retire, play golf, read, and watch our grandchildren have
children.
Enhancement is a misnomer. It suggests luxury. But enhancement is no luxury. In so far as it promotes
well-being, it is the very essence of what is necessary for a good human life.
There is no moral reason to preserve some traits -such as uncontrollable aggressiveness, a sociopathic
personality, or extreme deviousness. Tell the victim of rape and murder that we must preserve the natural
balance and diversity.
2. Genetic Discrimination.
Some people fear the creation of a two class society of the enhanced and the unenhanced, where the
inferior unenhanced are discriminated against and disadvantaged all through life.
We must remember that nature alots advantage and disadvantage with no gesture to fairness. Some are
born horribly disadvantaged, destined to die after short and miserable lives. Some suffer great genetic
disadvantage while others are born gifted, physically, musically, or intellectually. There is no secret that
there  are  ‘gifted’  children  naturally.  Allowing  choice  to  change our  biology  will,  if  anything,  be  more
egalitarian -allowing the ungifted to approach the gifted. There is nothing fair about the natural lottery
-allowing enhancement may be more fair.
But more importantly, how well the lives of those who are disadvantaged go depends not on whether
enhancement is permitted, but on the social institutions we have in place to protect the least well off and
provide everyone with a fair go. People have disease and disability -egalitarian social institutions and laws
against discrimination are designed to make sure everyone, regardless of natural inequality, has a decent
chance of a decent life. This would be no different if enhancement were permitted. There is no necessary
connection between enhancement and discrimination, just as there is no necessary connection between
curing disability and discrimination against people with disability.
 3. The Perfect Child, Sterility and Loss of the Mystery of Life.
If we engineered perfect children, this objection goes, the world would be a sterile, monotonous place
where everyone is the same, and the mystery and surprise of life is gone.
It is impossible to create perfect children. We can only attempt to create children with better opportunities
of a better life. There will necessarily be difference. Even in the case of screening for disability, like Down
syndrome, 10% of people choose not to abort a pregnancy known to have Down syndrome. People value
different  things.  There  will  never  be  complete  convergence.  Moreover,  there  will  remain  massive
challenges for individuals to meet in their personal relationships and in the hurdles our unpredictable
environment presents. There will remain much mystery and challenge -we will just be better able to deal
with these. We will still have to work to achieve, but our achievements may have greater value.
4.  Against human nature.
One of the major objections to enhancement is that it  is against  human nature.  Common alternative
phrasings are that enhancement is tampering with our nature or an affront to human dignity. I believe that
what separates us from other animals is our rationality, our capacity to make normative judgements and
act on the basis of reasons (Savulescu 2003). When we make decisions to improve our lives by biological
and other manipulations, we express our rationality and express what is fundamentally important about
our nature. And if those manipulations improve our capacity to make rational and normative judgements,
they  further  improve  what  is  fundamentally  human.  Far  from  being  against  the  human  spirit,  such
improvements express the human spirit. To be human is to be better.
5. Enhancements are self-defeating.
Another familiar objection to enhancement is that enhancements will have self-defeating or other adverse
social effects. A typical example is increase in height. If height is socially desired, then everyone will try to
enhance the height of their children at great cost to themselves and the environment (as taller people
consume more resources), with no advantage in the end since there will be no relative gain.
If a purported manipulation does not improve well-being or opportunity, there is no argument in favour of
it.  In  this  case,  the  manipulation  is  not  an  enhancement.  In  other  cases,  such  as  enhancement  of
intelligence, the enhancement of one individual may increase that individual’s opportunities only at the
expense of another. So-called positional goods are goods only in relative sense.
But many enhancements will have both positional and non-positional qualities. Intelligence is good not
just because it allows an individual to be more competitive for complex jobs, but because it allows an
individual to more rapidly process information in her own life, and to develop greater understanding of
herself and others. These non- positional effects should not be ignored. Moreover, even in the case of
so-called purely positional goods, such as height,  there may be important non-positional  values. It  is
better to be taller to be a basketball player, but being tall is a disadvantage in balance sports such as
gymnastics, skiing, and surfing.
Nonetheless,  if  there  are  significant  social  consequences  of  enhancement,  this  is  of  course  a  valid
objection. But it is not particular to enhancement -there is an old question about how far individuals in
society can pursue their  own self-interest  at  cost  to others.  It  applies to education,  health care,  and
virtually all areas of life.
Not all enhancements will be ethical. The critical issue is that the intervention is expected to bring about
more benefits than harms to the individual. It must be safe and there must be a reasonable expectation of
improvement. Some of the other features of ethical enhancements are summarised below.
What is an ethical enhancement?
1. It is in the person’s interests.
2. Reasonably safe.
3. Increases the opportunity to have the best life.
4. Promotes or does not unreasonably restrict the range of possible lives open to that person.
5. Does not harm others directly through excessive costs of making it freely available (but balance against
the costs of prohibition).
6. Does not place that individual at an unfair competitive advantage with respect to others, e.g. mind
reading.
7. The person retains significant control or responsibility for her achievements and self which cannot be
wholly or directly attributed to the enhancement.
8. Does not reinforce or increase unjust inequality and discrimination -economic inequality, racism. (But
balance the costs of social/environmental manipulations against biological manipulations).
What is an ethical enhancement for a child or incompetent human being?
All the above plus:
1. The intervention cannot be delayed until the child can make its own decision
2. The intervention is plausibly in child’s interests
3. The intervention is compatible with the development of autonomy.
 
Conclusion
Enhancement is already occurring. In sport, human erythropoietin boosts red blood cells. Steroids and
growth hormone improve muscle strength. Many people seek cognitive enhancement -nicotine, ritalin,
modavigil, caffeine. Prozac, recreational drugs, and alcohol all enhance mood. Viagra is used to improve
sexual performance.
And of course mobile phones and aeroplanes are examples of external enhancing technologies. In the
future, genetic technology, nanotechnology, and artificial intelligence may profoundly affect our capacities.
Will the future be better or just disease-free? We need to shift our frame of reference from health to life
enhancement. What matters is how we live. Technology can now improve that. We have two options:
1. Intervention: treating disease, preventing disease, supraprevention of disease -preventing disease in a
radically unprecedented way, protection of well-being; enhancement of well-being
2.  No intervention,  and  to  remain  in  a  state  of  nature   -  no  treatment  or  prevention of  disease,  no
technological enhancement.
I believe to be human is to be better. Or, at least, to strive to be better. We should be here for a good time,
not just a long time. Enhancement, far from being merely permissible, is something we should aspire to
achieve.
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